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Abstract
The recognition of a spectrum of gendered and sexed people, along 
with changing social conventions, has caused disruption in the abso-
lute and binary divisions between male and female, man and woman. 
Gender and sex are formally classified for many purposes; however, 
formal classifications can marginalize people with variable sex or 
those who do not identify with traditional understandings of gender. 
However, the instability is not a recent development, as demonstrated 
by historically changing conceptualizations of sex and gender in 
bibliographic classification, as well as in competing and interacting 
formal discourses. A discourse analysis was conducted on the con-
cepts of women and trans and intersex people in four editions of the 
Dewey Decimal Classification system, as well as on relevant American 
legal discourse to investigate how institutionally endorsed episte-
mology and ontology work together to influence how concepts are 
defined and classified. 
Introduction
Although classifications are human constructs, they can have serious con-
sequences on the lived experience of people being classified, as Bowker 
and Star (1999) and others have shown. Formal, institutionally backed 
classifications maintain an epistemic authority of how things “are” or 
“should be,” at the risk of marginalizing people who do not fall within 
prescribed categories or behave or look in ways that match the necessary 
and sufficient conditions required for membership in a category. In par-
ticular, the fluidity of sex, gender, and gender identity has burst the seams 
of the binary categories prescribed for them. Biology seems immutable, 
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but as understandings of sex, gender, and gender identity have evolved, 
the ontological characteristics and epistemic authority used to assign sex 
and gender have changed through time and can reflect the values and 
biases of those making the determination, including in bibliographic clas-
sification. With no one “ruling body” determining sex and gender classi-
fication, both individual perceptions and formal classifications of sex and 
gender have been shaped by the interplay of social, scientific, medical, 
legal, theological, academic, and pedagogical discourses, among others. 
The epistemic and ontological dynamicity underscores West and Zimmer-
man’s (1987) definition of sex as “a determination made through the ap-
plication of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons 
as females or males” (p. 127; emphasis added). Thus critically examining 
the historical epistemic underpinnings of concepts in a classification can 
help recognize epistemology’s role in formulating concepts and the clas-
sificatory structure. 
As one of the complicit discourses, legal discourse possesses classifi-
catory power that determines who is eligible for rights and protections. 
The law creates not only abstract definitions of justice and equality but also 
concrete determinations of sex differentiation that hold civil and even 
violent consequences in the lived experience of those impacted by its rul-
ings. Like bibliographic classification, it also maintains a provisionality re-
flective of the opinions of a particular court, attorney, or legislative body, 
which also influence a multitude of other discourses, including medical, 
religious, and commercial, that coalesce and are communicated through 
mass media. As Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (1881) fa-
mously wrote in The Common Law:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The 
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do 
than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. (p. 1)
The instability reflected above and in critical classification studies both 
point to the discursive construction of the subjects of sex and gender in the 
tradition of Foucault (1990), where discourses “interplay” to form dynam-
ic subjects rather than those that are stable, transcendent, and imposed. 
Subjects are products of a particular moment in time and an amalgama-
tion of micro, discursive apparatuses of power. These discourses must be 
examined in their contexts to see how epistemic positions manifest in con-
sequences for the users of systems. Legal discourse, on behalf of the state, 
codifies processes and procedures that define sex and gender, thus pro-
viding an articulated and invasive embodiment of ostensible social mores 
and values at particular temporal moments. Similarly, bibliographic clas-
sification classifies and makes accessible the knowledge communicated in 
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discourse. Hence this project investigates how concepts related to sex and 
gender are formed in legal and bibliographic discourse. It is important 
to distinguish here that the argument is not how legal categories influ-
ence the ways in which women or trans or intersex people perceive them-
selves (an argument made by Foucault in The History of Sexuality that is not 
explored here), or the social, informal perceptions of others, but rather 
how the concepts are epistemically formulated and codified in the law 
and bibliographic classification with or without the benefit of input from 
those being classified. Nor does the argument focus on, except to clarify 
historical usage and literary warrant, the nomenclature used to name the 
categories.
Methodology
Hjørland (2013) argues that the epistemic values of the classificationist 
body—those who have the authority to “know” or dictate the validity of 
knowledge for a domain—will be clearly evident upon examination of a 
classification. He writes that “ontological theory commits us to identify-
ing and classifying a number of phenomena in a specific way—and vice 
versa; a listing and classification of a number of phenomena may reveal 
the theoretical outlook of its creator (‘show me your classification and 
I’ll tell you what theory you subscribe to’)” (p. 171). The relationship 
between methodology and epistemology must be recognized. The methodolo-
gies used to ontologically define sex and gender relate to epistemology by 
showing how knowledge is legitimated through the credibility of evidence 
or process (for example, logic, induction, and observation), identification 
of the authority (for example, attorney, classificationist, or subject), and 
subjectivity. Kleineberg (2013, p. 341) argues that the “ontological dimen-
sion should be seen as inextricably interwoven with the epistemological 
(including methodological) dimension,” as one shapes the other. 
To test that notion, a sample of American legal discourse, including le-
gal dictionaries, medical jurisprudence texts, case law, and legislation, was 
reviewed, along with four editions of the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) 
system to sense what kind of epistemic stances could be detected, as well 
as any interplay among them. The media, and pedagogical, theological, 
or other discourses also have impact (elsewhere, medical discourse was 
examined in similar fashion [Fox, 2014]), but the scope of this study was 
to examine legal discourse and the DDC as two of the “major narratives, 
which are recounted, repeated, and varied; formulae, texts, and ritualized 
sets of discourses” (Foucault, 1982, p. 56) to see how their interplay bears 
out in sex and gender classification. 
An analysis influenced by Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis, 
chosen because of its purposeful emphasis on power relationships, was 
conducted on the periods leading up to the publication of four editions 
of the DDC in which significant changes in sex and gender classification 
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occurred (1871–1885, 1958–1965, and 1971–1979). The concepts investi-
gated included the classification and treatment of women and trans and 
intersex people. Men as a class are discussed in some cases for comparison 
of treatment; however, generally speaking, men hold epistemic power dur-
ing these historical periods and are treated as the norm from which other 
categories deviate, and the intention here is to focus on how those without 
power are represented in the classification.
Foucault (1982, p. 56) calls direct discourse “internal procedures”—
here, the text and structure of the DDC, along with introductory material, 
scope notes, title pages, and so on. A specific set of epistemic clues were 
sought during examination, such as authority, fallibility, necessary and 
sufficient conditions, ontology, and rhetorical space, as well as “implica-
ture,” which Budd and Raber (1995, p. 219) identify as subtext or implied 
“rules” that are not expressed directly but can indicate ideology. Ontology 
here refers to literary warrant, or the idea that a classification is, or should 
be, based on a given collection. The collection represents what “is” or 
exists in the domain the classification covers. Searches for sex and gender 
concepts in WorldCat and Google books’ Ngram viewer on a selection of 
the vocabulary used in each time frame provided rough estimates of the 
extant literature and dominant terminology. Rhetorical space, a concept 
articulated by feminist epistemologist Lorraine Code (1995), describes 
spaces where “territorial imperatives” (p. ix) communicate the authority 
and respect to make knowledge claims. In the text of the classification, 
this manifests in the structure and naming of concepts (Olson, 2007). Fou-
cault (1990) also writes that discourse analysis is meant to “discover who 
does the speaking, the positions and viewpoints from which they speak, 
the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store 
and distribute the things that are said” (p. 11). If authority determines 
which subjects are present and erased in formal discourse, the inclusions 
and erasures are evident in the rhetorical space of a classification.
The legal literature constitutes discourse that Foucault (1982, p. 57) 
says “operate[s] . . . from the exterior,” or the discourse that is not directly 
associated, but has influence. Since no formal, singular definition of sex 
or gender exists in legal discourse, it was analyzed for ontological clues of 
what the legal institution considered characteristics of sex or gender dur-
ing the specified time frames. The findings from legal discourse and DDC 
were then compared for epistemic commonality or departure. The “defi-
nitions” of sex and gender in legal discourse typically took two forms. First, 
defining occurred when a distinction must be made between those men 
and women who identify with their sex, usually when explaining why it is il-
legal for women to do the things men do, and later explaining why women 
ostensibly perform poorly at the things men do. To narrow the literature, 
the focus is on legal explanations as to why women cannot work, mostly 
in the context of practicing law. The second type of defining occurs when 
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attorneys encounter transgender practices or intersex bodies. These usu-
ally are found in cases where trans or intersex people wish to marry, vote, 
or practice some other sex-segregated occupation. Because of space, the 
findings are necessarily reduced to a few representative examples. These 
examples are not interpreted to be the collective opinion of the discur-
sive community, as Budd, Hill, and Shannon (2010, p. 271) warn against 
interpreting each “individual as fully representing society.” Instead, they 
are considered publicly communicated examples of institutionally backed 
attitudes that contribute to wider perceptions of sex and gender, which 
ultimately can influence bibliographic classification. 
The Period 1871 to 1885
Women in Legal Discourse
As Dewey was devising the first edition of the DDC between 1871 and 1876, 
the first wave of white feminism focused on getting legal rights recog-
nized—specifically, suffrage, education, and employment. In Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary (1870), the entry “Sex” notes unspecified “physical difference 
between male and female animals,” which somehow produces legal differ-
ences: “In the civil state, sex creates a difference among individuals,” listing 
restrictions for women, such as entering into contracts or holding office (p. 
517). The “Women” entry states that they are “all the females of the human 
species . . . who have arrived at the age of puberty” (p. 679). “Mankind” is 
defined as “persons of the male sex; the human species,” but clarifies that 
“females as well as males are included” (p. 99). Taylor and Reese’s influen-
tial A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence (1873), in providing guidance for de-
termining the sex of intersex people, suggests that because women possess 
breasts, vaginas, uteruses, and ovaries, these render them “irritable and 
vain,” with “shrill and squeaking voices” (pp. 675, 679). Males, by contrast, 
can be taken more seriously due to the “grave tone of voice, the pres-
ence of a beard, the width of the shoulders and the narrowness of the 
pelvis” typical of most men (p. 669). When Lavinia Goodell applied to the 
Wisconsin State Bar, the chief justice referred to the female sex’s “gentle 
graces, its quick sensibility, its tender susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, 
its emotional impulses, its subordination of hard reason to sympathetic 
feeling.” Furthermore, working women were prevented from “the bearing 
and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the homes of 
the world and their maintenance in love and honor,” and “when voluntary, 
treason against it” (In re Goodell, 1876). In Bouvier’s 1871 Law Dictionary, a 
husband is required to “love his wife, and to bear with her faults [no such 
faults in husbands are mentioned in the entry for “Wife”], and if possible, 
by mild means to correct them” (p. 675). Twice, the definition mentions 
that a husband can make decisions without his wife “controlling” him.
The definition of wife also notes: “A great change in favor of the wife 
has been produced by recent statues in a majority of the United States”; 
692 library trends/spring 2016
it also declares that “for her protection, the wife is rendered incapable of 
binding herself by contract” (Bouvier, 1871, p. 661; emphasis added). The 
key legal term is incapacity, defined as “the want of a quality legally to do, 
give, transmit, or receive something” (p. 695). “Incapable people” possess 
some quality or deficiency that renders them unable to make decisions, 
but not always permanently: “In general, the incapacity ceases with the 
cause which produces it. If the idiot should obtain his senses, or the mar-
ried woman’s husband die, their incapacity would be at an end” (p. 695). 
However, between 1848 and 1900 the Married Women’s Property Act had 
been passed, eliminating the concept of women’s incapacity, yet married 
women and “idiots” exemplified incapacity in legal dictionaries until 1948. 
Women, even those considered “capable” elsewhere, are silenced in the 
rhetorical space of the profession:
Single or unmarried women have all the civil rights of men . . . but they 
are, generally, not possessed of any political power; hence they cannot 
be elected representatives of the people, nor be appointed to the offices 
of judge, attorney at law, sheriff, constable, or any other office, unless 
expressly authorized by law. (Bouvier, 1871, p. 679)
If women are prohibited from serving on juries or working as an attor-
ney or judge, they then are excluded from defining their own legal rights 
without voice or recourse; yet “the principal reason of this exclusion is to 
encourage that modesty that is natural to the female sex, and which ren-
ders them unqualified to mix and contend with men” (p. 517). 
In denying Myra Bradwell’s bar application, the United States Supreme 
Court contended:
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign of-
fices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules 
of civil society. (Bradwell v. State of Illinois, 1873)
 Goodell was also “protected” from the legal profession, which is 
selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive 
and obscene. . . . It would be revolting to all female sense of innocence 
and sanctity of their sex, shocking to man’s reverence for womanhood 
and faith in woman, on which hinge all the better affections and hu-
manities of life, that woman should be permitted to mix professionally 
in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into courts of justice. 
(In re Goodell, 1876)
Thus this “law of nature,” code for “divine” law, often justified why women 
could not do what men do (Austin, 1832, p. 2). 
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Women in the DDC’s First Edition
Dewey published his forty-two-page first edition anonymously in 1876, 
with his name only appearing in the copyright statement. It was titled A 
Classification and Subject Index for Cataloguing and Arranging the Books and 
Pamphlets of a Library. Throughout the preface, Dewey positions himself as 
a humble, hard-working librarian concerned solely with how his scheme 
benefits both librarians and patrons. He remarks that “it was the result of 
several months’ study . . . of hundreds of book and pamphlets, and in over 
fifty personal visits to various American libraries” (p. 3), and professes that 
“the author has no desire to claim original invention for any part of his 
system.” Dewey wrote that he had been influenced by a Milanese library, 
and that “the inverted Baconian arrangement of the St. Louis Library has 
been followed” (p. 10). He did not attempt to map all knowledge, as other 
classifiers did (Frohmann, 1994, p. 113), nor did he claim accuracy. Dewey 
(p. 4) admitted that “the impossibility of making a satisfactory classifica-
tion of all knowledge as preserved in books, has been appreciated from 
the first, and nothing of the kind attempted,” and that “theoretical har-
mony and exactness has been repeatedly sacrificed to the practical re-
quirements of the library,” which sets up his pragmatic intentions to make 
a “useful” classification.
Dewey did not include a singular class for women (nor men for that 
matter) other than circuitously, through “woman-education” and “woman- 
suffrage”—classes likely warranted by the literature. He explained that 
for the convenience of the user, “the most nearly allied subjects precede 
and follow” each other (p. 7). The only other feminine class, 618 “Obstet-
rics and Sexual science,” is situated next to 619 “Veterinary medicine,” 
which implies a close relationship. Dewey’s source of literary warrant was 
the Amherst College Library collection. As an all-male institution, it is 
quite possible that few works on women were in the collection. A search in 
WorldCat for “women” in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century time frame 
indicates that a great deal of literature on them had been published. Much 
fits into the suffrage, education, home, and gynecology-obstetrics classes, 
as expected; however, many works addressed notable women and their ac-
complishments (for example, Goodrich’s 1855 Lives of Celebrated Women). 
Revisions in Dewey’s second edition create a place for such works. 
The gender-related topics in the classification and the relative index 
outline the roles of a woman as dictated by warrant in combination with 
the classificationist’s worldview. In the first edition’s subject index, some 
feminine-identified concepts can be found, but they all relate to educa-
tion, reproduction, religion, or exceptional circumstances—parallels of 
the headings that exist in the classification. The remaining terms include 
“housewifery,” “midwifery,” “pregnancy,” “maternity,” and “mothers,” 
which are classified under “Family.” “Fathers” was not included in the in-
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dex or scheme. The only two terms in the classification and index that 
do not relate to the domestic sphere represent institutions that excluded 
women: “suffrage” and “education.” 
Women in the DDC’s Second Edition
With Dewey still editor, the classification’s second edition in 1885 expand-
ed to 315 pages, with input from “hundreds of specialists” (p. 7). His mod-
est tone in the first edition’s preface became boastful. He now referred to 
it as the “Dewey System” (p. 48), and his name was prominently displayed 
along with a laundry list of his credentials, including “Professor of Library 
Economy and Chief Librarian of Columbia College; Consulting Librarian 
of Wellesley College; Secretary[,] American Library Association; late of 
Amherst College Library, and Editor of Library Journal,” with an “etc., etc.” 
tacked on at the end. The publisher’s note exhorted that “ten years’ expe-
rience has more than confirmed the great hopes of its usefulness” thanks 
to “many unsolicited and enthusiastic testimonials” (p. 7). The system is 
useful to “some school-boy” to the “President of some Royal Scientific So-
ciety,” as well as to the “ignorant and the lerned,1 by the most painstaking 
and accurate scholars, by hurried men of business” (p. 7). In response to 
the feedback he received on the first edition, Dewey defensively writes that 
“no individual is sufficiently lerned to wisely classify books on all subjects 
and sciences . . . [but] by the aid of specialists, the index can in time be 
made reasonably accurate” (p. 34). Although he “is always grateful for sug-
gestions,” Dewey advises that “the only safe rule is to make no changes or 
subdivisions without submitting them to the author, who will gladly advise 
on such matters without charge, not on the ground of any superior wis-
dom,” but rather to prevent the user from inevitable “blunders” (p. 50). 
Ten years’ worth of feedback and literary warrant evidently indicated 
that space was needed for women’s topics. A WorldCat search retrieves 
around 35,000 titles on women published between 1850 and 1885, and 
consequently women finally received their own classes—the infamous 
396 “Women’s position and treatment” and an expansion of 376 “Educa-
tion of Women.” The new location, the 390s “Customs, Costumes, and 
Folklore,” was an odd choice, given Dewey’s principle of allied topics, but 
he includes a disclaimer that “many minor subjects have been put under 
general heads to which they do not strictly belong. . . . The rule has been 
to assign these subjects to the most nearly allied heads, or where it was 
thought they would be most useful. The only alternative was to omit them 
altogether” (p. 25). Hierarchical force demanded that “Women’s position 
and treatment” shared characteristics with customs, costumes, and folk-
lore, and then also characterized women as a “minor subject”: 
391 Costume and Care of person 
392 Birth, Home and Sex Customs
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393 Treatment of the Dead
394 Public and Social Customs 
Including fairs; chivalry, tournaments; dueling, suicide
395 Etiquet
396 Women’s position and treatment
397 Gipsies Nomads Outcast races
398 Folklore Proverbs 
399 Customs of war
Weapons, war dances, treatment of captives, scalping, mutilation, 
burning, cannibalism, etc.
Women are allied with “Etiquette,” “Outcast races,” “suicide,” and “Treat-
ment of the Dead,” implying some sort of relationship. “Birth, Home and 
Sex Customs” includes marriage, sexual relations, and concubinage. 
The subdivisions of class 396 provide a more serious rhetorical space 
and seem to be warranted for subjects lacking in the previous edition:
 .1 Emancipation
 .2 Legal status, property, rights, etc.
 .3 Political status
 .4 Education
 .5 Employment
 .6 Woman in home
 .7 Delineation of woman in art
 .8 Delineation of woman in literature
 .9 Woman in history, politics, war–Amazons
These subdivisions acknowledge a wider range of roles for women beyond 
the domestic sphere and thus more recognition of women’s value and de-
sire to be emancipated. The 376 “Education of women” class expanded to 
include “convent education,” “‘fashionable’ education,” and the “physical 
and mental capacities of women” (with no parallel class for men). “Wom-
en as teachers” in 371.18 was likely warranted by the Common School re-
form movement of the time that advocated teaching as a female-intensive 
profession based on the belief in women’s maternal nature and morality.
Elsewhere, the rhetorical space suggests relationships or value judg-
ments based on the allied topics. For example, “Woman suffrage” is allied 
with “Slavery,” and “Labor of Women” is allied with “Labor of convicts and 
children,” thus communicating disapproval. Other new developments 
perhaps justifying literary warrant were the expansion of “Sexual ethics,” 
which arranged newly included topics seemingly from good to bad: “chas-
tity,” “celibacy,” “continence” (abstaining from even marital sex), “solitary 
vice” (masturbation), “social evil” (sex crimes like rape and pedophilia), 
“adultery,” “immoral art,” and “immoral literature.” “Mental character-
istics as influenced by sex” allies with “physiognomy,” “phrenology,” and 
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“witchcraft,” showing the emerging understanding of the connection be-
tween sex and mind, although none were considered medical or scientific. 
A few additions to the scheme acknowledge men’s roles within the family: 
173.3 “Duties of husbands and wives,” and 173.5 “Duties of parents.”
Intersex People in Legal Discourse
Legal literature on intersex people, then called “hermaphrodites,” dates as 
far back as Aristotle. British physician James Parsons (1741) cataloged the 
legal treatment that various societies had historically imposed on intersex 
people, including being “shut up in a chest, and thrown into the Sea” or pro-
hibited from “convers[ing] with Men alone in any private place” (p. xxvi). 
Intersex people were also canonical topics in medical jurisprudence litera-
ture (a sample chapter title: “Hermaphrodites, Doubtful Sex, Monsters”) 
(Dean, 1866). Physicians were consulted to decide the “true sex” of their 
patients who wanted to legally marry, vote, or have heteronormative sex 
(Reis, 2009). In Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1871, p. 665), “hermaphrodites 
[were] “persons who have in the sexual organs the appearance of both 
sexes. They are adjudged to belong to that which prevails in them.” It goes 
on to say that “cases of malformation, however, sometimes are found, in 
which it is very difficult to decide to what sex the person belongs” (p. 665). 
The phrasing shows how epistemic authority resides with physicians or 
attorneys who “decide” rather than with the person being “adjudged.” 
Taylor and Reese’s A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence (1873) describes 
how an intersex person, Levi Suydam, was judged to be a woman due to 
his sexual attraction to males, his “aversion to” and “inability to perform 
bodily labor,” and that he had “a fondness for gay colours, for pieces of 
calico” (p. 676). Using “abnormal,” “defective,” “deformity,” and “the be-
ings” as words to describe hermaphrodites, the Manual stated that it is 
“not easy to assign a sex, but this is of minor importance” (p. 696). Else-
where, it describes a woman who had an “abundance of beard and pro-
fuse whiskers,” and another woman acquaintance that “had so much hair 
upon her chin she was obliged to shave like a man,” and finally concedes 
that “in some cases external examination will entirely fail to indicate the 
sex” (p. 671). A person with no external sex organs, A Manual of Medical 
Jurisprudence concludes coldly, “must be placed among those monstrous 
subjects, in which there is, properly speaking, no sex, and which therefore 
cannot enter a marriage contract with either a male or a female” (p. 281). 
Intersex People in the DDC’s First and Second Editions
In the first edition (1876) of Dewey’s classification, “Hermaphrodites” ap-
pears only in the relative index, directing catalogers to 612 “Physiology for 
humans.” A search in WorldCat for “hermaphrodites” between 1850 and 
1871 retrieves nineteen titles in English that refer to them, including a 
doctoral dissertation of 1875 on the medical and legal aspects of hermaph-
roditism, but adds only a few more titles between 1876 and 1885. The 
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words “curious,” “remarkable,” or “monstrosity” appear in some titles, but 
not in Dewey’s classification language until the next edition. 
In the second edition of the DDC (1885), “Hermaphrodites (man)” is 
still only found in the index, but now users were directed to 573.7 “Craniol-
ogy” (a pseudoscience similar to phrenology) and is allied with “Dwarves 
and Giants” and “Monstrosities.” The connection between craniology and 
intersex is unclear, other than that phrenologists believed that personal-
ity, as well as femininity and masculinity, were influenced by the size and 
development of the skull and passed down from the mother. Undoubtedly, 
the alliance with dwarves, giants, and monstrosities suggests abnormality, 
grouped together as perceived freaks of nature.
Trans People in the DDC’s First and Second Editions
Neither “trans people,” “transvestism,” nor “cross-dressing” appear in the 
first two editions of the DDC or the legal dictionaries. The concept appears 
briefly only in the medical jurisprudence texts as “concealed sex,” as no 
one could identify any illegality unless intentional fraud or homosexual 
sex was committed. A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence stated that homo-
sexuality “belongs in the annals of imposture rather than medical jurispru-
dence” (Taylor & Reese, 1873, p. 678). Despite their relative inattention 
at this time, during the following century, trans people would come to 
dominate gender-related discourse.
Summary of the Period, 1871–1885
To summarize, the ontological traits of woman, as expressed through ex-
amples in legal discourse, include that women possess innate delicacy, 
timidity, weakness, and piety, and that they are instinctively nurturing, 
maternal, and caring yet incapable and unfit for public service. These 
traits render women best-suited for the home and childrearing and are 
celebrated as positive and ideal; they are reinforced in opposition to men’s 
characteristics through active “othering” and presented as immutable by 
the “law of nature.”
The second edition of the DDC (1885) slightly improved its inclusive-
ness over the first, reflecting women’s desires to enter into those institu-
tions from which they were excluded. However, similarly to legal discourse, 
Dewey’s classification system continued to minimize women’s roles outside 
the home, thus maintaining the “separate spheres” ideology. Regardless 
of how seemingly insulting or puzzling the class for women was, it would 
take eighty years and second-wave feminism before any changes would ac-
tually occur. Trans people were not present in either legal discourse or in 
the DDC, and intersex people were at first cast not unfavorably in Dewey’s 
system as just another type of anatomic category, but then later, as in legal 
discourse, they were allied with monstrosities and curiosities, thus begin-
ning their jarring journey throughout the classification.
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The Period 1958 to 1965
Women in Legal Discourse 
Sex and gender research exploded in medicine and psychology during 
the 1950s and 1960s, but the legal backdrop remained quiet. Little revi-
sion in legal dictionaries meant that outdated definitions were being used. 
In the 1951 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, the definition for sex was 
taken from Webster’s Dictionary rather than case law, statutes, or medicine: 
“The sum of the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a 
male from a female organism; the character of being male or female” (p. 
1541). “Character” seems to indicate an acknowledgment of gender role, 
but “women” remain biological, as merely “all the females of the human 
species . . . who have arrived at the age of puberty” (p. 1779). Entries for 
“Husband” and “Wife” note that they are correlatives of each other (thus 
thwarting any notion of same-sex marriage). Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 
(1948) nostalgically acknowledges the expansion of women’s rights: “for-
merly, he might use such gentle force to restrain her of her liberty . . . but 
now this is otherwise,” and warns that “any chastisement inflicted on the 
wife renders him guilty of assault and battery” (p. 512), which had not 
been a concern in the past. 
The “Marriage” entry repeats that it is the “relation of one man and 
one woman” and “founded on the distinction of sex” (p. 1123). “Married 
woman,” as opposed to “wife,” has much more extensive definitions, most-
ly giving specific direction for property disputes with husbands. Women 
now served on juries, and although they had experienced the “enlight-
ened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of 
bygone years . . . [the] woman is still regarded as the center of home and 
family life” (Hoyt v. Florida, 1961), which allowed the automatic exemption 
of women because presumed family duties superseded civic duty. 
Women were unequal under the law until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was passed, which reversed the legal definition of a woman from an un-
equal “other” to an equal. Eight civil rights acts were passed between 1866 
and 1991, and only the 1964 act mentioned “sex,” which still was only a 
last-minute addition. Title VII of the act prohibits discrimination against 
individuals of specifically protected classes, including sex, race, color, re-
ligion, and national origin, and it established the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission. The Equal Pay Act had been passed the previous 
year, which outlawed wage discrimination “on the basis of sex.” 
Women in the DDC’s Seventeenth Edition
When the seventeenth edition of the DDC was published in 1965, Dewey 
had been dead for thirty years. Editor Benjamin Custer eliminated Dew-
ey’s simplified spelling and argued for the “integrity of a subject” over the 
“preference for practicality over theory” (Dewey & Custer, 1965, p. 43). 
Custer was critical of Dewey, evidenced in his description of the original 
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introduction as “now obsolete, and it should be read in the context of its 
time” (p. 61). Custer credits the convenience of the DDC for its popular-
ity, but not because of “any theoretical excellence of his arrangement” 
(p. 13). The “sacrifices to accuracy for the sake of economy” beloved by 
Dewey disappeared in a maze of arcane instructions intended to restore 
the “integrity” of the subject. One reviewer criticized the amount of re-
locations and the length of the numbers, but mostly the complicated in-
structions and fewer cross-references, along with the “vitriolic tone” and 
“rigid fanaticism” of the editors (Hinton, 1966, pp. 396–401). 
The editorial team’s focus on the “integrity of numbers” resulted in 
many overdue changes made to the system. Custer tried to correct the 
“haphazard groupings of terms” by placing subjects in more appropriate 
hierarchies, writing that “this edition emphasizes the hierarchical nature 
of true classification and restores the hierarchical feature of Dewey’s nota-
tion” (Dewey & Custer, 1965, p. 44). Custer repeatedly emphasized that 
the pace of knowledge necessitates change, and that classification is an 
imperfect instrument that will evolve with its times: “It appears unlikely 
that this or any other general classification will ever be ‘perfect,’ especially 
in view of the traditional dichotomy of demands for a system that will be 
both stable and up-to-date” (p. 61). He notes that “the faults inherent 
in the DDC are many. No serious student of classification since 1876 has 
failed to note them” (p. 15). 
Indeed, after nearly a generation, women finally were removed from 
the problematic 396 class. Since the placement of women in 396 violated 
hierarchical force, or what Custer called the “drip” principle, women, 
and for the first time men, were transplanted to 301.4 “Institutions and 
Groups,” thus positioning them as social groups. Following the drip princi-
ple meant that they were also considered “Social characteristics and prob-
lems.” “Man” seemed to be a perfunctory complement to “Woman,” as it 
had no subheadings. The scope note reflected the adversarial influence 
of second-wave feminism.
301.41 The sexes 
.411 Man
.412 Woman. Scope: feminism, superiority
.412 1 Emancipation
.412 2 Careers
.412 6 In the home
.412 9 In history, public affairs, war
If “social group” takes the social sciences definition of a group as being 
“bound together by patterns of interaction,” that interaction here is sex, 
unsurprisingly, given the sexual-liberation movement of the 1960s. The 
contents of “Sexual ethics” were emptied into “The sexes” to create a 
hybrid in which the subclasses all relate to sexuality, and as allied topics, 
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the relationship between men and women is a sexual problem. The other 
subdivisions include:
.413 Celibacy
.414 Courtship 301.425 Including preparation for marriage 
.415 Sex life outside marriage; Concubinage, premarital relations, adul-
tery, prostitution, homosexuality and other perversions
In the relative index “Sex” refers to biology (that is, the current under-
standing of sex) and psychology (the current understanding of gender). 
In “Sex psychology” the concept of gender appeared, but still under the 
name of sex and laden with sexuality:
155.3 Sex psychology
.31 erogenity and libido
.32 sex and personality
.33 sex differences
.332 Masculinity
.333 Femininity
.334 Bisexuality
.34 sex relations
Masculinity and femininity refer to what we would now call “gender roles.” 
In the nineteenth century, the term bisexuality had originally referred to 
hermaphroditism, but by this time it had connotations of its current usage 
as a type of sexual orientation. WorldCat indicates that the current usage 
was present, but only emerging in publications during that time. It is un-
clear which usage is meant in the 1965 DDC; the index only refers to “sex 
difference,” whereas the term “androgyny”—which means something 
entirely different—does not appear. WorldCat reveals about a tenfold in-
crease in the amount of works on women from 1850 and 1965, to nearly 
300,000 volumes in English. Between 1958 and 1965, the titles include 
many biographies of notable women or women in particular professions 
or contexts, indicating women’s changing status.
Intersex People in Legal Discourse and the DDC’s Seventeenth Edition
In the 1948 edition of Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, a hermaphrodite was more 
guardedly called “a person of doubtful or double sex; one possessing, re-
ally or apparently, and in more or less developed form, some or all of the geni-
tal organs of both sexes” (p. 860; emphasis added). It had no referent. 
A medical jurisprudence article in 1960 cited current usage—“intersex” 
and “sex variation”—in describing medical rather than social methods of 
sustaining a particular sex. It stated how, historically, intersex people were 
“allowed” to choose their desired sex, but dismissed its value in favor of a 
physician’s opinion (Bowman & Engle, 1960, p. 295).
 legal discourse’s epistemic interplay/fox 701
In the DDC, “Hermaphrodites” had been cut from the index of the 
controversial fifteenth edition of 1951, but “Hermaphroditism/animal 
physiology” was restored in the sixteenth edition (1958). In the seven-
teenth edition of 1965 only “Hermaphroditic reproduction” was present 
in the relative index, directing catalogers to see “Reproduction.” Howev-
er, hermaphroditic reproduction means the ability to self-fertilize, which 
does not apply to humans. A search for “hermaphrodite” and “human” 
in WorldCat between 1958 and 1965 retrieves a significant increase in the 
literature, to around 140 items in English, mostly in medicine or psychol-
ogy. On rare occasions the titles suggest a relationship between intersexu-
ality and homosexuality. Google’s Ngram viewer indicates a steep spike in 
the use of the term “intersex” between 1960 and 1965 (the most signifi-
cant spike was between 1920 and 1940). “Hermaphrodite” remains mostly 
static in the literature after a large decline since the nineteenth century 
but draws significantly more results than “intersex” (Ngram cannot disam-
biguate animal and human intersexuality).
Trans People in Legal Discourse
“Transvestism” and “transsexuality” were the dominant terms used within 
this time frame (1958–1965), and “transgender” was still a decade away 
from being coined. In 1952 Christine Jorgenson had the first successful 
sex reassignment surgery (SRS), and the media relentlessly fed social cu-
riosity and titillation toward transsexuality (Meyerowitz, 2002). Surgeons 
who treated transsexuals were at risk for legal action and threatened with 
prosecution for inflicting “mayhem.” According to Black’s Law Dictionary 
(1951), mayhem occurs when one purposely “disables, disfigures, or ren-
ders [a member] useless, or cuts or disables the tongue, or puts out an 
eye, or slits the nose, ear or lip” (p. 1131). A medical jurisprudence article 
mentions that mayhem laws were “extended to include any willful dis-
figurements of the body” such as castration or removal of other healthy 
organs or tissue, which was considered unethical (Sherwin, 1954, p. 243). 
Bowman and Engle (1960, p. 307) concede that the mayhem laws are a 
substitute “for want of a suitable modern law.” Although no one was ever 
charged with mayhem, many felt intimidated enough to prevent them 
from performing surgery, despite doing similar procedures to intersex pa-
tients (Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 122). 
Arrests for trans behaviors were also due to imaginative interpretation 
of the criminal codes. In New York, “cross dressing was formerly punish-
able by section 887 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which defined as 
a ‘vagrant’ (subd. 7) ‘A person, who, having his face painted, discolored, 
covered or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calcu-
lated to prevent his being identified, appears in a road, or public highway, 
or in a field, lot, wood or enclosure’” (People v. Simmons, 1974). The writ-
ten decision for People v. Hale (1960), a case in which a man was convicted 
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of having “made indecent, lewd, and homosexual proposals to a police 
officer,” cited the code’s subdivision 4 of section 887, which described 
vagrants as those who engage in any “lewd or indecent act” or who loiter 
“for the purpose of inducing, enticing or procuring another to commit 
lewdness, fornication, unlawful sexual intercourse or any other indecent 
act.” Although portions of New York’s criminal code were revised in 1967, 
there continued to be cases in which trans people were prosecuted as 
“vagrants” using section 887. For example, in People v. Archibald (1968), 
section 887, subdivision 7 was used to convict a man for “impersonating a 
female.” In 1960, legal scholar Morris Ploscowe, who by this time was an 
influential commentator on sex and the law in New York State, argued that 
the unenforceable and inconsistent illegality of private, consensual sex 
acts was a product of American prudishness and needlessly harmed trans 
people (pp. 217–218). 
During this time period, the United States had begun a movement 
toward standardization through mechanisms such as driver’s licenses, 
passports, and birth certificates, which required the sex to be identi-
fied (Spade, 2008, pp. 765–766). Legal codes provided no guidance for 
amending birth certificates, so it was inconsistently administered at the 
local level. Some physicians began providing letters certifying that their 
transsexual patients were undergoing treatment to transition so that they 
could amend the sex on their birth certificates (Meyerowitz, 2002, p. 165).
Trans People in the DDC’s Seventeenth Edition
In the seventeenth edition of the DDC (1965), “transsexuality” does not 
appear anywhere, but “Transvestism” is indexed, where users are instruct-
ed to see “Sexual disorders” under “Other Diseases/Psychoneuroses.” It 
lands in “Other disorders,” allied with a range of “sexual aberrations, ma-
nias, perversions”: 
616.858 3 Sexual aberrations, manias, perversions
.858 32 Frigidity and impotence
.858 33 Nymphomania and satyromania
.858 34 Homosexuality
.858 35 Sadism and masochism
.858 39 Other disorders
.858 4 Other character neuroses
.858 42 Kleptomania
.858 43 Pyromania
.858 44 Homicidal and suicidal compulsions
.858 45 Compulsive lying and defrauding
.858 8 Mental deficiency feeble-mindedness and mental 
retardation
The choice of “transvestism” over “transsexualism” clearly shows the 
influence of warrant. A search for “transsexual” between 1850 and 1965 
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retrieves around thirty titles, along with an assortment of archival material 
from underground transsexual organizations or personal papers of trans 
people that originated during the period though may not have been col-
lected until later. About half of the literature is medical studies by familiar 
names in sexology research, but the amount of fiction and testimonials 
increased. “Transvestism,” on the other hand, between 1850 and 1965, re-
trieves about three hundred titles, including serials and more archival ma-
terial. The nonmedical titles often include the words “masquerade,” “im-
personator,” or “imposter.” A number of titillating titles concerning male-
to-female trans people appeared during this era—for example, Muscle 
Man in Silks (1963).
Summary of the Period, 1958–1965
The feminist movement, as well as research into sex and gender, most 
likely spurred change in the DDC, but with women presented as both so-
cial problem and sexual object (which is also how they were considered 
in legal discourse), change would finally occur fifteen years later. Intersex 
people were a perennial object of study in both discourses, but in the 
1950s they took a lower priority than the newer curiosity, trans people. 
With the intense attention on Jorgenson, transgenderism and transsexualism 
were in the spotlight, but the constant shifting of these terms within the 
DDC indicated uncertainty about where to classify them. Regarding trans 
people, it seemed that the intent of legal discourse was to protect moral-
ity, or at least to protect traditional definitions of sex in order to enforce 
heteronormativity.
The Period 1971 to 1979
Women in Legal Discourse
During the 1970s, women’s rights were largely legally recognized, but it 
did not entirely translate to social change and thus required constant liti-
gation. Most of legal discourse acknowledges that the difficulty of women 
in the professions relates to social circumstances (for example, discrimina-
tion and family pressures) rather than women’s ability to perform. How-
ever, a remnant of the nineteenth century—“protection”—continued to 
be a theme, such as in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company (1967) in which 
women though not men were terminated from their factory jobs. Taylor 
v. Louisiana (1975) made jury duty compulsory for women; although dif-
ferences were recognized, they were among individuals rather than the 
group as a whole:
The factors which tend to influence the action of women are the same 
as those which influence the action of men—personality, background, 
economic status—and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women 
when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men like-
wise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the other foot, who 
would claim that a jury was truly representative of the community if all 
men were intentionally and systematically excluded from the panel? 
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The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up 
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the 
subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponder-
ables. . . . Yet a flavor, a distinct quality, is lost if either sex is excluded.
 Similarly, other decisions like Roe v. Wade (1973) take a more critical 
approach, minimizing morality and emphasizing the phenomenological, 
social-constructionist aspects. The Roe v. Wade decision takes into consid-
eration 
recent attitudinal change, of advancing medical knowledge and tech-
niques, and of new thinking about an old issue. . . . One’s philosophy, 
one’s experiences, one’s exposure to the raw edges of human existence, 
one’s religious training, one’s attitudes toward life and family and their 
values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, 
are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and conclusions.
In other legislation, the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act added a 
clause to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, stating that “on the basis of sex” also 
referred to pregnancy and pregnancy-related conditions.
Women in the DDC’s Nineteenth Edition
Changed thinking also was reflected in the nineteenth edition of the DDC 
(1979). Dewey’s “mostly obsolete introduction has been dropped,” and 
the return to conventional spelling was completed (Dewey & Custer, 1979, 
p. xxii). The ALA’s Feminist Task Force of the Social Responsibility Round 
Table had been in existence for nearly a decade, with one of its goals be-
ing “nonsexist cataloging” (Maack, 1994, p. 232). Despite this, the users’ 
guide of the DDC shows the limits of the task force’s influence: 
While realizing that some readers will find distasteful the constant 
use of “he,” “his,” and “him,” to refer generically to classifiers of both 
sexes, the editors . . . find any other device or circumlocution either 
awkward or artificial, or an intrusion upon the sense of the exposition, 
and they have agreed to use the traditional masculine forms in their 
generic sense. (p. xxxvii)
  “The sexes” moved again within “Sociology.” In this version, sexuality 
and feminism were minimized, and the space took on a demographic tone: 
305.3–4 Specific Sexes
305.3 Men
Single, married, divorced, widowed, of various specific 
racial, ethic, national language group or adherent to spe-
cific religion
305.4 Women
.42 Social role and status
.43 Occupations
.44 Specific kinds of women
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The scope note lists specific kinds of men, but the omission of parallel 
subheadings for occupations and the social role and status indicates that 
the male norm has not yet been challenged. A WorldCat search indicates 
another substantial increase, to around 171,000 titles, about women pub-
lished between 1965 and 1979 (including over forty items with the simple 
title “Women”), many about women’s history and activism. In the Ngram 
viewer during this time frame, “woman” begins a steep climb, peaking in 
1995.
Intersex People in Legal Discourse and the DDC’s Nineteenth Edition
During this time frame, the Ngram viewer shows a negligible drop in oc-
currences of “hermaphrodite” and minor rise in “intersex.” In World-
Cat, “intersex” reveals about three hundred entries in English, about a 
third of them concerning zoology. Those works on human intersex pose 
it as a “problem” or “disorder.” A search for “hermaphrodites” and “hu-
man” from the same period retrieves around three hundred fifty results, 
showing terminological transition. The titles include many urology and 
endocrinology texts, but have slightly more references to identity consid-
erations, such as gender roles. The references to intersex people as “cu-
riosities” or “monstrosities” give way to words like “freaks,” “fringe,” or 
“abnormal.” The term intersex still did not appear in legal discourse, where 
hermaphrodite remained with the same definition from 1948, but with the 
addition of a Latin passage that translates as “an hermaphrodite is to be 
considered male or female according to the predominance of the exciting 
sex” (Black, 1968, p. 860) and cites seven-hundred-year-old British law—
the same source for the use of “monster” (p. 1158). 
In the DDC (Dewey & Custer, 1979), “Hermaphroditism” returned and 
finally earned a classification, 616.694, in “Sexual disorders.” Its new al-
liance with “Impotence,” “Sterility,” and “Male Climactic disorders” re-
moved it from reproduction and physiology to male sexuality (female 
sexual disorders are classified in “Gynecology”), but it was no longer con-
sidered sociopathic. Confusingly, 157 “Psychoneuroses” in psychology still 
included sexual disorders, and, similarly, the language toned down slightly 
from the previous edition: 
.7 Disorders of character and personality Examples: sexual disorders
 and dysfunctions, kleptomania, compulsions
.8 Mental deficiency
.9 Clinical psychology. Class clinical psychology of a specific condition
 with the subject, e.g., of homosexuality 157.7
Psychologically, it is considered “psychoneuroses,” but clinically it is a 
“sexual-performance disorder.”
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Trans People in Legal Discourse
The publicity and research attention paid to trans people during the 1950s 
and 1960s found its way to the courts in the 1970s. The terms transvestite, 
transsexual, and cross-dress did not appear in the 1968 edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary, and the lack of precedent continued to cause trans people to be 
prosecuted under tangentially related laws, such as those for homosexual-
ity, vagrancy, and prostitution, all of which were illegal (p. 1386). A 1971 
law review article, “Transsexuals in Limbo,” articulates this dilemma: “the 
law has not faced the question of defining an individual’s sex. The paucity 
of legal precedents for transsexuals leaves a void that is likely to be filled 
with inappropriate medical or moral judgments until laws are changed or 
interpreted so as to recognize this human phenomenon” (p. 236).
For example, a trans person was arrested under a century-old law in-
tended to prevent farmers from dressing as Indians (Matto, 1972, p. 104). 
Trans prostitutes were treated as “double deviants” by the police, who ha-
rassed them and subjected them to strip searches (Wojdowski & Tabor, 
1976, p. 201). Matto’s 1972 Criminology article reports that transsexuals’ 
greatest crime is “the possession of an undesirable unique characteristic 
that is sanctioned by society in general,” but that tolerance would grow 
because it “does not represent any real threat” (p. 98). The trans people 
are subjected “to arrest whenever he appears in public wearing the clothes 
of his choice, but also forces him to face potential harassment and ridi-
cule. . . . Although his behavior is not in any way disruptive or destructive, 
the transsexual is subjected to legal and emotional punishment because 
his psychological development does not match his chromosomal makeup” 
(“Transsexuals in Limbo,” 1971, p. 253). The fear of prosecution for may-
hem also continued. Surgeon Richard Green (2010) describes his risk as-
sessment for SRS circa 1968:
[The university attorney] conceded that I would be vulnerable to pros-
ecution for mayhem. The penalty if convicted was up to 10 years in 
prison. Furthermore, since this proposed act involved two of us, a psy-
chiatrist and a surgeon, it constituted conspiracy. The penalty was now 
up to 14 years. But, the university counsel reassured me, the University 
would pay our legal bill. [The patient] had her surgery. We were not 
prosecuted. (pp. 1459–1460)
 As the number of sex changes increased, the designation of sex on 
identification documents became an area of dispute. In 1965, a request by 
the New York City Board of Health resulted in the following conclusions: 
“male-to-female transsexuals are still chromosomally males while osten-
sibly females”; and “it is questionable whether laws and records such as 
birth certificates should be changed and thereby used as a means to help 
psychologically ill persons in their social adaptation” (Swartz, 1997, §3). 
As of 1968, only Illinois had a provision for amending birth certificates, 
specifically relating to SRS: the Illinois Vital Records Act (Ill. Ann. Stat., 
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1967). Prior to this, other states had procedures for correcting “errors” 
(whereby a clerk would cross out the original designation and write the 
new one above it) and other ways for “altering” (whereby a new certificate 
was issued) (Anonymous v. Weiner, 1966; Holloway, 1968, pp. 288–289). The 
concern was that legal fraud could be committed by concealing one’s true 
identity; however, fraud requires “intent to deprive another of his right, 
or some manner to do him an injury,” with proven damages (Black, 1968, 
p. 789). But by the early 1970s, several states’ statutes allowed individuals 
to change the sex designation on their birth certificates; for example, Ari-
zona Revised Statute (1969) and Louisiana Revised Statute (1971). 
In many states, the sex of both spouses needed to be clear in order to 
avoid accidentally validating same-sex marriage. In 1970, a British case, 
Corbett v. Corbett, determined that gonads, chromosomes, and external 
genitals could establish the true sex, identifying postoperative transsexu-
als with their birth sex despite gender identity or surgical treatment. With 
the lack of a U.S. precedent, Corbett was influential in the United States (B. 
v. B, 1974). In Anonymous v. Anonymous (1971) the decision used quotation 
marks around the pronouns, thus undermining the gender identity of the 
defendant; for example, “‘she’ made ‘herself’ available.” Another case, 
M.T. v. J.T. (1976), designated sex as being determined by marriage rather 
than by birth, the decision stating that
if the psychological choice of a person is medically sound, not a mere 
whim, and irreversible sex reassignment surgery has been performed, 
society has no right to prohibit the transsexual from leading a normal 
life. Are we to look upon this person as an exhibit in a circus side 
show? What harm has said person done to society? The entire area of 
transsexualism is repugnant to the nature of many persons within our 
society. However, this should not govern legal acceptance of a fact. The 
Committee is therefore opposed to a change of sex on birth certificates 
in transsexualism. (p. 83)
Moreover, in this case, the concealed identity of the parties involved im-
plies a degree of shame regarding the topic of the proceedings.
Trans People in the DDC’s Nineteenth Edition
In WorldCat, around six hundred results for “transsexualism” appear in 
English, including eleven dissertations. Trans titles include works on self-
help, the psychological aspects of postoperative life, religion, marriage, 
and the law; also, the search revealed a continued association with homo-
sexuality. Despite the literary warrant, in the nineteenth edition of the 
DDC (1979), “Transvestism” remained the terminology but changed from 
an “other” sexual disorder to “Sexual Deviations.” “Transgender” still 
does not appear in the Ngram viewer, but it indicates that “transsexual” 
started increasing in use in 1970. 
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Summary of the Period, 1971–1979
The rapid changes in the gender classifications in the DDC after eighty 
years should naturally be caused by changes in the literature; however, 
other influences are also involved. As civil rights legislation made women 
legally equal to men, the nineteenth edition of the DDC balanced the 
entries in 305; yet it continued using sexist pronouns purportedly for con-
venience and smooth syntax, just as hidden discrimination continued in 
workplaces. Representation was restored for intersex people, although 
now their classification as a male disorder is only slightly preferable to 
being relegated to a category to which they share nothing in common. 
Transsexualism, despite overwhelming literary and legal warrant, remains 
subsumed with transvestism in the DDC. 
Discussion
Spade (2011) writes that “time and again the law has changed, been de-
clared newly neutral or fair or protective, and then once more failed to 
transform the conditions of disparity and violence that people were resist-
ing” (p. 27). To this end, the discursive analysis and its products showed 
a difference between professed and enacted epistemologies; in other 
words, domains may communicate an epistemic ideal, but espoused prac-
tice or results may differ. The dominant enacted epistemology expressed 
through the identified examples in legal discourse, at least until the Civil 
Rights Act, is positivistic, where the authorities or “enunciative modali-
ties” (Foucault, 1972, p. 50) observe women within the context of social 
conventions to find or intuit “facts” about them and then create deduc-
tive conclusions based on observations originating from within limited 
experience (a priori knowledge discounted). Budd (2001) calls positivism 
“deterministic scientism” and criticizes its propensity to create absolutist 
theories from limited observation (p. 96). The subjectivity of the object is 
discounted because it cannot be verified; it results in a reverse version of 
Spivak’s (1993, p. 5) notion of “strategic essentialism.” Rather than women 
creating a strategic alliance to gain otherwise unattainable political power, 
they instead are essentialized or “othered” for the purpose of restricting 
their political power. Another type of essentialism evident is the “confer-
ralist” variety—an antirealist position that holds that essentialism is “con-
ferred” rather than “real.” Conferred qualities arise from societal values 
that are “expressed in our conceptual practices” rather than by what is 
“real” (Sveinsdottir, 2008, p. 136). The quality of “piety in women,” for ex-
ample, characterizes what Sveinsdottir calls prototypical “ideal versions” 
(p. 139). 
As time passes, the language referring to women in legal discourse 
changes from patronizing to insulting, whereas the language toward trans 
people moves from insulting to suspicious. and the very idea of being in-
tersex confounded the legal community. Early on, so-called women’s char-
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acteristics, such as delicacy, were celebrated, but by the mid-to-late twenti-
eth century the social obligations toward home and family took the blame. 
“Weak” or “incompetent” replaced “delicate” or “maternal,” blaming the 
double biological imperatives of reproduction and physical weakness. 
Methodologically, the knowledge of these traits is based on observation 
by the men who serve as enunciative modalities within the profession, and 
are applied absolutely through logical deduction and attributed to the 
positivistic “law of nature” or the circular “law of the land” (for example, 
trans people are immoral because they are different and women cannot 
vote because it is illegal). What they observe consists of social norms with-
in the experience of a privileged white circle, broadly considered. Grosz 
(1994) calls this type of metaphysical essentialism “naturalism,” where 
“women’s nature is derived from God-given attributes that are not expli-
cable or observable simply in biological terms” (p. 84). Despite this, rights 
eventually were recognized by those who still relied upon observation but 
used an inductive approach, focusing instead on the individual observed 
in each situation. Thus these individual cases provided opportunities over 
time for women to join in knowledge-generation and the observed reality 
of the domain.
The DDC reflects that women were erased from the 1876 edition, ghet-
toized in the 1885 edition, and pathologized, sexualized, and problema-
tized in the 1965 edition. The frequent changes in the DDC for intersex 
people (in every edition from the fifteenth to the nineteenth) convey in-
decision of just where to place the classification, as reflected in the litera-
ture. Intersex people changed in the DDC from anatomically variant to 
pathologized deviants, whereas in legal discourse, the opposite occurred. 
Intersexuality as a sexual disorder, of course, is contingent on the defi-
nition of “normal,” and the authorities making decisions are decidedly 
observers rather than knowing subjects. The placement of trans people 
could be attributed to convenience or even confusion rather than accu-
racy, but the “integrity of the subject” principle implies a belief in the 
accuracy of the hierarchical force. Custer’s “drip principle,” while profess-
ing to reflect reality, results in the (perhaps) unintended consequence of 
providing no disclaimer for difficult-to-classify concepts, such as intersex 
or trans people. It leads to a deterministic epistemology whereby being 
a woman mandates domesticity, motherhood, and exclusion from insti-
tutions; trans people are deviant or disordered; and intersex people are 
medical mysteries. 
Dewey based his structure on warrant in combination with his lived 
experience as a librarian and a privileged, heteronormative white man. 
According to Code (1995, p. 44), the transformation from subject to ob-
ject reduces a person to a collection of observable traits. If an authorita-
tive “enunciative modality,” such as Dewey via his classification, perceives 
women or trans people to be absent from intellectual life, then absence 
710 library trends/spring 2016
is the observable feature and therefore how they are defined. If author-
ity determines which subjects we can speak about and what subjects are 
erased in formal discourse, the inclusions and erasures are manifested in 
the rhetorical space of a classification. In law, women are posed as hav-
ing innate and immutable characteristics that “other” them from men; 
intersex people are “othered” through their inscrutability; and the law 
searches for a way to make being trans illegal. The choice of traits and the 
implication of condemnation reflect the goal of the classification system 
(Olson, 1999).
To their credit, both Dewey and Custer (1965, 1979) repeatedly ac-
knowledge the fallibility and artificiality of both knowledge and discipline-
based classifications and the resulting consequences to the classificatory 
structure. Dewey professes a pragmatic, critical, and realist approach by 
showing a “concern with causality and the identification of causal mecha-
nism in social phenomena” (Wikgren, 2005, p. 15). The positivism dem-
onstrated in legal discourse involves accepting conditions as they are, be-
cause they are observed that way. Although Dewey may not have had expe-
rience with trans or intersex people other than through the literature, he 
certainly was exposed to women; he “experienced” them performing work 
within his field and thus his perceptions were informed by this. In 1886 he 
wrote: “Women have usually poorer health and as a result lose more time 
from illness and are more crippled by physical weakness when on duty”—a 
sentiment found in legal discourse. However, he went on to say that “this 
is a fault of circumstance, not necessarily of sex,” and “a strong, healthy 
woman is worth more than a feeble man for the same reason that a strong 
man gets more than a weak woman” (p. 20). 
Despite his mixed record in action, Dewey acknowledged the role 
of societal norms and took a phenomenological approach in which he 
“bracketed” assumptions. However, he still was influenced by social struc-
tures, which limited, phenomenologically speaking, his critical assessment 
of intention. Budd et al. (2010) describe Bhaskar’s approach to critical 
realism as “epistemological fallibilism,” which includes “intransitive ob-
jects”—unchanging things in a mind-independent reality—and “transitive 
objects”—things defined at specific points in scientific history (p. 272). 
Dewey’s recognition of the fallibility of his definitions was evidenced by 
repeated professions of the imperfection of his scheme (transitive ob-
jects); his ontological justification comes from literary warrant (intransi-
tive objects). Custer also recognized the mutable nature of knowledge, but 
attempted to change the professed epistemology from a pragmatic and 
utilitarian approach to one that “reflects reality” more accurately, both 
ontologically (for example, better representation of relationships) and 
epistemically (for example, recognition of the fallibility of knowledge). 
The authoritative, intentional, and cognitive aspects are professed to some 
degree, but ultimately are sacrificed to the pragmatic goal of efficiency 
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and the rationalist requirement that values “conceptual clarity and evi-
dence and which prefers deductive methods rather than inductive meth-
ods” (Hjørland, 2004, p. 135). 
Conclusion
The DDC’s Aristotelian, logical structure necessitates a rationalist ap-
proach resulting in mutually exclusive classes, yet the changes to gender 
classification manifest the influence of external discourse. Hjørland ex-
plains that “rationalism looks at our concepts as inborn structures, which 
match and classify our perceptions” (p. 135). In fact, the concept of bib-
liographic control contradicts the idea of subjectivity, engaging absolutism 
in order to smooth exceptions and influencing our ways of thinking. Legal 
discourse shows how to combat entrenched rationalism with inductive ap-
proaches. Ultimately, this research led back to the inevitable and unavoid-
able questions in critical knowledge organization: Should a classification 
be useful or accurate? Useful for whom? What is being “accurate”? In the 
editions examined, the DDC, unsurprisingly, to some degree replicates 
the biases relating to sex and gender evident in legal discourse, a conse-
quence both of the literature and wider social conventions. It brings to 
light the roles of emotion, uncertainty, and self-interest in influencing the 
epistemic stances taken in classification.
Note
1.  Dewey ardently supported spelling reform, helping to found the Spelling Reform Associa-
tion in 1876. The use of simplified spelling in the DDC began minimally, but gradually 
increased, culminating in the thirteenth edition (1932), which included a fourteen-page 
explanation of simplified spelling and was edited by another reform advocate, Dorkas Fel-
lows. Starting with the fourteenth edition (1942), the DDC slowly returned to conventional 
spelling until the remaining simplified spelling was finally dropped in the nineteenth 
edition (1979) by editor Benjamin Custer.
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